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OUTER SPACE: HOW SHALL THE WORLD’S
GOVERNMENTS ESTABLISH ORDER AMONG
COMPETING INTERESTS?
Paul B. Larsen †
Abstract: We are in a period of transition in outer space; it is becoming
increasingly congested. As one example, small satellites are beginning to interfere with
astronomical observations. The objective of this article is to examine and evaluate how the
various outer space interests interact, coordinate or conflict with each other. This article
examines legal order options and the consequences of choosing among those options.
Cite as: Paul B. Larsen, Outer Space: How Shall the World’s Governments Establish Order
Among Competing Interests?, 29 WASH. INT’L L.J. 1 (2019).

I.

INTRODUCTION: WHY ORDER IN OUTER SPACE?

Outer space seems unlimited; at least it so appeared in 1957 when
Sputnik was launched. Since then, space activities have blossomed and many
more are coming. There are now approximately 2000 functional satellites. On
May 23, 2019 Space-X launched a mission that placed 60 more satellites into
low Earth orbit (“LEO”). Space X plans to launch 12,000 satellites. Blue
Origin will launch another 4,000 satellites. One Web is launching 650
satellites. Military planners intend to orbit hundreds of new spacecraft.1 Other
launch operators of different nationalities have announced launch plans for

†

© Paul B. Larsen. The author taught air and space law for more than 40 years respectively at
Southern Methodist University and at Georgetown University. He is co-author of FRANCIS LYALL AND PAUL
B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE (Routledge, 2nd ed. 2017). and of PAUL B. LARSEN, JOSEPH SWEENEY
& JOHN GILLICK, AVIATION LAW. CASES AND RELATED SOURCES (Martinus Nijhof, 2nd ed., 2012) (Send
comments to pblspace @aol.com). The author thanks Professors Frances Lyall, David Koplow, Matthew
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1
Sandra Erwin, As It Plans LEO Constellations, DOD Must Prepare to Deal with Congestion,
SPACENEWS, June 10, 2019, at 30 [hereinafter LEO Constellations]. For further discussion, see generally:
Paul B. Larsen, Space Traffic Management Standards, 83 J. AIR L. & COM. 359, 359–87 (2018) [hereinafter
Space Traffic]; Paul B. Larsen, Solving the Space Debris Crisis, 83 J. AIR. L. & COM 475, 475–519 (2018)
[hereinafter Solving]; Paul B. Larsen, Minimum International Norms for Managing Space Traffic, Space
Debris and Near Earth Object Impacts, 83 J. AIR L, & CON 739, 739–785 (2019) [hereinafter Managing];
Paul B. Larsen, International Regulation of Near Earth Objects, 67 GER. J. AIR & SPACE L. 105, 105 (2018)
[hereinafter Regulation]; Paul B. Larsen, Small Satellite Legal Issues, 82 J. AIR L. & COM. 275, 275–309
(2017) [hereinafter Small Satellite]; and Paul B. Larsen, Outer Space Arms Control, Can the USA, Russia
and China Make this Happen?, 23 J. CONFLICT AND SECURITY L. 137, 137–159 (2018) [hereinafter Arms
Control].
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thousands of additional functional satellites. Many small satellites are
destined to form large constellations.
Space traffic congestion is a present problem and getting worse. The
U.S. military considers outer space to be dangerously congested. The
congestion consists not only of the large number of orbiting satellites; it
includes more than one million pieces of uncontrolled orbiting space debris
that must be avoided by functional satellites. Functional satellites need to be
deorbited and replaced regularly by new satellites. Frequent launches and
deorbits through crowded Low LEO pose another traffic problem. Satellite
operators agree that space traffic management (“STM”) is needed. 2 Removal
of existing space debris is not yet feasible. The Kessler Syndrome looms
unless space debris can be controlled.3 While existing COPUOS space debris
guidelines promise to diminish the generation of new debris, that will not be
adequate. 4 More extensive debris control is needed in order to avoid the
foreclosure of outer space. Another space traffic concern is the danger of
losing control over orbiting satellites due to cyberattacks. Operators need to
protect their computer systems from being hijacked by outsiders.5
Space is legally non-sovereign. 6 No one country is permitted to control
all moving objects in outer space, because outer space cannot be appropriated
2

LEO Constellations, supra note 1, at 30.
The Kessler Syndrome predicts the foreclosure of outer space unless the current trend in space debris
is reversed. See Donald J. Kessler & Burton G. Cour-Palais, Collision Frequency of Artificial Satellites: The
Creation of a Debris Belt, 83 J. J. GEOPHYSICAL RES. 2637, 2637 (1978) [hereinafter Collision Frequency].
According to the Kessler Syndrome, space debris of critical mass will fragment in further collisions, leading
to cascading chain activity. See Donald J. Kessler et al., The Kessler Syndrome: Implications to Future Space
Operations, 33RD ANN. AAS GUIDANCE & CONTROL CONF., at 2 (Feb. 6–10, 2010),
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.394.6767&rep=rep1&type=pdf
[hereinafter
Kessler Syndrome]. The unending fragmentation chain reaction may eventually foreclose access to outer
space, which is a danger to all outer space activities. See Kessler Syndrome, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kessler_syndrome (last visited Dec. 20, 2019).
4
See Inter-Agency Space Debris Coord. Committee, IADC Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines
(Sept. 2007), https://www.iadc-online.org/index.cgi?item=docs_pub [hereinafter Mitigation Guidelines]. See
also COPUOS Space Debris Guidelines, in 3 COLOGNE COMMENTARY ON SPACE LAW 605 (Stephan Hobe,
Bernhard Schmidt-Ted, & Kai-Uwe Schrogl eds., 2013).
5
Ingo Bauman et al., GNSS Cybersecurity Threats, An International Law Perspective, INSIDE GNSS
MAGAZINE June 3, 2019, at 30.
6
The relevant space law treaties include: Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 610
U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]; Convention on Registration of Objects Launched Into Outer
Space , Nov. 12, 1974, 1923 U.N.T.S. 15 [hereinafter UN Registration Convention]; Convention on
International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter
Liability Convention]; Agreement on Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of
Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue and Return
3
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by any one state. Each state can legally only govern its own orbiting space
objects. 7 Therefore, an internationally agreed upon legal order will be
required to manage traffic in outer space.
While no one can appropriate space, nevertheless there are many
stakeholders. They compete and often conflict with each other. Each seeks to
hold outer space open for its own legal outer space activities. This paper
identifies the main stakeholders. How do they interact? How could they
possibly accommodate each other to extend the uses of outer space to all
authorized users of all nationalities?
First, the paper considers the option of no legal order in outer space;
activity would be on a first come, first serve basis. The second legal order is
based on freedom of scientific investigation in outer space. A third order
considers outer space as a global commons. A fourth is the order established
by outer space treaties. A fifth is the order already established by the
International Telecommunication Union for navigation of satellites by use of
radiofrequencies. A sixth is the military order, which views outer space purely
as a military domain. A seventh is the commercial order in outer space being
created as thousands of small commercial satellites are launched into orbit by
Space-X, Blue Origin, One Web and others. An eighth order is established
through the United Nations by international codes and guidelines intended to
enable users to accomplish their tasks and protect their investments. This
confused situation may lead to chaos, with winners who dominate outer space
and losers who will be pushed aside. Ultimately, the entire Earth-Space
infrastructure needs coordinated order allowing co-existence.
The United Nations started us on the right path by approving the 2008
space debris guidelines now being adopted by all the countries. However
military engagements by China and India have already added thousands of
debris into outer space. Moreover, the thousands of small satellites now being
launched to improve communication and for remote sensing, when added to
existing military debris, may eventually block access to outer space. 8
Agreement]; and Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, July
11, 1984, 1363 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Moon Agreement].
7
Outer Space Treaty art. VIII, supra note 6, at 209; see also Space Policy Directive-3, National Space
Traffic Management Policy, 83 Fed. Reg. 28,969 (June 18, 2018) [hereinafter STM]; Presidential
Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-3, National Space Traffic Management Policy (June 18, 2018),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/space-policy-directive-3-national-space-trafficmanagement-policy/ [hereinafter Space Policy Directive–3].
8
Kessler Syndrome, WIKIPEDIA, supra note 3.
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Currently outer space activities are disturbing the natural Earth-Space
relationship.9
THE OLD ORDER: GOVERNMENT DOMINATION

II.

There are a variety of stakeholders in outer space that compete and
often conflict with each other. Each stakeholder seeks to make its own space
activities possible. The objective of this section is to identify the main
stakeholders to understand how they interact.
A.

Government Stakeholders

Governments were the first stakeholders. They potentially are involved
in all space activities ranging from activities in which they participatice to
activities they merely authorize. Included are commercial satellite operators,
surface users of satellite communication services, Global Navigation Satellite
Services (“GNSS”), astronomers, and military satellite operators. In 1957,
when the Russian Sputnik satellite was orbited, governments and exploring
scientists were the main stakeholders. The governmental interest followed
naturally from the development of military launch rockets during World War
II by Germany. The military rockets eventually became the launch vehicles
for satellites. The rockets were military craft and their military potential was
their main importance to the states that operated them. Russia and the USA
were the major stakeholder countries in 1957.
Today some developed countries, in particular the United States, have
a keen interest in facilitating space activities by non-governmental
commercial operators. 10 Space activities by non-governmental operators are
growing rapidly. Most of the activities relate to commercial remote sensing
satellites and communication satellites. The expectation is that there will be
huge growth in small satellites active primarily in LEO. In addition to the
United States, other countries that also authorize significant commercial space
traffic include Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Germany and France.
Under the Outer Space Treaty (“OST”) Art. VI, the individual countries
are responsible for compliance of their non-governmental operators with the
OST. Under OST Art. VII, states assume liability for all damages caused by

9
10

Id.
See STM, supra note 7; Space Policy Directive–3, supra note 7.
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their military, civilian, and other non-governmental operators. 11 The 1972
Liability Convention 12 further implements the international law of state
liability. These laws gave the governments significant stakes in all outer space
with a consequence of minimizing governmental liability.
Most space technology is dual use (joint commercial and military);
there is frequent interchange of technology between military and civilian
functions. The distinction between governmental stakes in civilian and
military uses was made at the beginning of the space age. Governmental outer
space activities were originally military in nature. In 1958, the United States
separated civilian and military space activities by establishing the National
Astronautics and Aeronautics Administration (“NASA”), responsible for
civilian outer space activities, 13 while the Department of Defense retained
control over military activities.
Military authorities are motivated by their interest in effective and
successful war fighting and in military activities short of war. In 1967, at the
time of the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty, the interest of military
strategists was to ensure that adversaries did not gain exclusive control of
outer space.14 Subsequent to 1957, military space technology leaped forward.
Thus, at the present time (2019), the three major military space powers—the
United States, Russia, and China—are actively competing with each other to
develop their outer space military capabilities. 15 They have recently been
joined by India. Altogether, they invest increasingly in military space
technology. 16
The United Nations is an important forum for governments to assert
claims to authority in outer space. Non-military issues are discussed in the
United Nations Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer (“COPUOS”).
11

Outer Space Treaty art. III, supra note 6, at 208.
Liability Convention, supra note 6; 2 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 83–202; Paul B.
Larsen, Does New Space Require New Liability Laws?, 68 GER. J. AIR & SPACE L. 196, 196 (2019).
13
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426, 426 (1958) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2451(a) (2006)).
14
Outer Space Treaty art. II, supra note 6, at 208 (mandating that outer space cannot become the
sovereign territory of any one state); Outer Space Treaty, in 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 613.
See generally FRANCIS LYALL AND PAUL B. LARSEN, SPACE LAW: A TREATISE (2nd ed. 2017).
15
See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 447–81.
16
Jen DiMascio & Lee Hudson, A Shakeup in U.S. Military Space, Aviation and Space Technology,
AVIATION WEEK (April 15, 2009) https://aviationweek.com/print/defense/shakeup-us-military-space. See
also Paul B. Larsen, Outer Space Arms Control: Can USA Russia and China Make This Happen, 23 J. OF
CONFLICT SECURITY L. 137, 137–58 (2018).
12
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Multilateral military outer space claims are discussed in the UN Disarmament
Conference which meets in Geneva, Switzerland. Claims of authority are
similarly asserted in bilateral negotiations.17
B.

Developing Countries’ Claims to Explore and Use Outer Space

The principle of sovereign equality prevails in UN decision-making.18
The United States, China, Luxembourg, Ghana, and Cameroon each have one
vote in UN negotiations. This parallels how COPUOS operates on the basis
of equality of states.19 The space powers need the support of the non-spacepowers to obtain approval for their proposals.20 The developing states used
their voting power to their advantage in the OST negotiations in 1967. They
have continued to use this voting power to their advantage in the negotiation
of the UN Sustainability Guidelines. 21 The developing countries can benefit
from the non-governmental space services of the space powers. Operators in
developed countries make satellite communication, remote sensing, and
GNSS technology available to the developing countries at a price. For
example, the communication company One Web plans to make Internet
connection available where it does not exist in Africa. 22 However, a 2019
conference of African states in South Africa indicated that the interest of the
African states cannot be fully realized by private companies from the
developed world. The African countries agreed that they must assert their
equal rights in outer space to their advantage and must work together to
maintain their socioeconomic interests in outer space. That requires them to
use their voting powers in COPUOS to assert their claims to authority. To
make effective use of their rights, these nations need technical and economic
capabilities that they do not yet have. They can insist on receiving technology
and economic resources by negotiating directly with the commercial

17
Disarmament,
UNITED
NATIONS,
https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpHomepages)/6A03113D1857348E80256F04006755F6 (last
visited Aug. 24, 2019). Outer Space Treaty art. VII was negotiated in COPUOS. See LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note 14, at 13–18.
18
See U.N. Charter.
19
See Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR OUTER SPACE
AFFAIRS, https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/copuos/index.html. See also LYALL & LARSEN, supra
note 14, at 14–18.
20
COPUOS makes decisions by consensus.
21
Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Draft Rep. of the Legal Subcomm. on Its Sixty-Second
Session, Annex II, Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/L.318/Add.4 (2019).
22
ONEWEB, https://www.oneweb.world/ (last visited July 15, 2019).
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companies.23 They can also benefit from obtaining capacity building from the
developed world through COPUOS. 24 Thus, the developing countries have a
keen interest in the international regulation of outer space activities by
operators from developed countries, and those interests must be
accommodated.
The Nineteen States Parties to the 1979 Moon Agreement 25

C.

The 1979 Moon Agreement repeats many of the legal principles of the
Outer Space Treaty, such as the principle that the moon and the celestial bodies
cannot be appropriated. However, OST Article I does not include the notion
of common exploitation of lunar resources. 26 The Moon Agreement, Article
11, pronounces that the Moon and celestial resources are the “common
heritage of mankind.” The States Parties to the Moon Agreement are
committed to protect this basic principle on use and exploitation of lunar and
celestial resources.
Several US commercial companies have recently expressed intentions
to extract lunar mineral resources. New US law recognizes the legal right of
commercial companies to own lunar resources as being compatible with the
OST. 27 However, the US has not joined the Moon Agreement and does not
accept the Moon Agreement’s legal principle of the Moon being the “common
heritage of mankind.” Claims of legal entitlement to celestial mining raise the
question of unilateral appropriation of outer space resources. By adopting this
new law, the US appears to claim stakes in the Moon and other celestial
bodies. That claim differs from the claimed stakes of the 19 countries which
are parties to the Moon Agreement. The differences go to the heart of the way
outer space shall be regulated. Subsequently, because the technology

23

See Peter Martinez & Ian Christensen, African Perspectives on the Space Resources Dialogue,
SECURE WORLD FOUNDATION NEWSLETTER (Secure World Foundation, Broomfield, CO), June 5, 2019,
info@swfound.org.
24
Id.
25
Moon Agreement, supra note 6.
26
See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 59.
27
U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 129 Stat. 704, 721
(2015). Luxemburg also recognizes the legal right of commercial companies to own lunar resources. See
Franz Schilling, Fishing in Outer Space – The Luxembourgish Interpretation of the Appropriation of in-Situ
Resources, 68 ZLW 248, 253–60 (2019).
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necessary for lunar mining has not yet developed, tensions between the two
groups have abated for the moment. 28
The Equatorial States Parties to the 1976 Bogotá Declaration29

D.

The OST does not define the border between air space and outer space.
Equatorial states are of the view that the geostationary orbit (“GSO”) is not
part of outer space; they claim sovereign rights to the GSO above their
territories. A number of equatorial states met in Bogotá, Colombia in 1976 to
declare that the GSO above their territories is their sovereign space. By doing
so, they claimed jurisdiction over property rights in their GSO and now
demand that satellites in GSO orbit above their territory obtain special permits
from the subjacent government. These equatorial states also treat the GSO as
the border between their sovereign and non-sovereign space; all activities in
their sovereign space would be subject to their domestic laws. This would
limit their stake and their interest in international regulation of outer space to
all space beyond the GSO. Their claim has not been adopted by other
stakeholder states.
E.

International Organizations

International governmental organizations approve of the COPUOS
claim precedential jurisdiction for creating order in outer space. 30 As a
committee of the UN General Assembly, COPUOS has a unique stake in outer
space order as the major forum for international discussion of international
space activities. The work of the Committee is divided between its Scientific
and Technical Subcommittee (“STSC”) and its Legal Subcommittee (“LSC”).
COPUOS is serviced by the United Nations Office of Outer Space Affairs
(“UNOOSA”), 31 which administers several special outer space subject
groups. These include the United Nations Register of Objects Launched into
Outer Space and the UN Platform for Space-Based Information for Disaster
Management and Emergency Response (“UN-SPIDER”). UN-SPIDER in
28

Michael Bruno, Is Space Due for Some Bootstrapping?, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY
(Feb. 28, 2018) (report on Deep Space Industries and Planetary Resources—two companies involved in lunar
mining); see also Brian Israel, Space Resources in the Revolutionary Course of Space Lawmaking, 113 AJIL
UNBOUND 114, 118 (2019) (2018 COPUOS Legal Subcommittee failed to put the issue on its agenda because
the commercial market for asteroid and lunar mining has not developed).
29
LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 160–62; 1 COLOGNE COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 55.
30
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF. (UNOOSA),
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/cpuous/index.html (last visited June 30. 2019) (reports to the Fourth
UN Committee by COPUOS); see infra note 209.
31
UNOOSA, http://www.unoosa.org (last visited June 20. 2019).
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turn administers the UN Disaster Charter and serves as nerve center for
international disaster relief.
The International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”) is an organization
to which virtually all the states are members. 32 The ITU regulatory activities
are authorized by the ITU Constitution 33 (a treaty instrument) and by its
administrative regulations. 34 Although ITU is a specialized agency of the
United Nations, it is governed by its separate treaty instruments.35 ITU’s claim
to authority in outer space is founded on the need for exclusive
radiofrequencies for guidance of satellites. Operators need to navigate their
satellites unhindered by radio interference. The key phrase is “harmful
interference.”36 Radio interference with a radiofrequency renders a satellite
unnavigable and, thus, useless. The problem and its solution are spelled out in
Art. 44 of the ITU Constitution: 37
Radio frequencies and orbits are limited natural resources and
they shall be used rationally, efficiently and economically . . . so
that countries or groups of countries may have equitable access
to both taking into account the special needs of the developing
countries and the geographic situation of particular countries.
A plenipotentiary conference of states meets every 4 years to review
current ITU regulation and to make fundamental changes in the treaty
structure. Being a treaty organization, only states can become members of the
ITU. However, being a technical organization, the ITU needs the technical
expertise of non-governmental operators. Thus, non-governmental agencies
and operators may become members of specialized sector activities of the
ITU.
32

LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 194–95.
See Int’l Telecomm. Union [ITU], Constitution of the International Telecommunication Union,
reprinted in COLLECTION OF THE BASIC TEXTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION
ADOPTED BY THE PLENIPOTENTIARY CONFERENCE, http://perma.cc/WC8J-JMAX (2015) [hereinafter ITU
Constitution].
34
LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 194–95.
35
Id.
36
ITU, RADIO REGULATIONS, art. 1.169 (2016), http://www.itu.int/pub/R-REG-RR-2016 (defining
harmful interference as “[i]nterference which endangers the functioning of a radio navigation service or of
other safety services or seriously degrades, obstructs, or repeatedly interrupts a radiocommunication service
operating in accordance with Radio Regulations (CS).”) [hereinafter RADIO REGULATIONS]; see Ingo
Baumann, GNSS Cybersecurity Threats: An International Law Perspective, INSIDE GNSS MAG. (June 3,
2019), https://insidegnss.com/gnss-cybersecurity-threats-an-international-law-perspective/.
37
See ITU Constitution art. 44, supra note 33, at 49.
33
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The European Space Agency (“ESA”) is an example of a regional
governmental organization with a significant stake in organization and use of
outer space resources. Several other international organizations also assert
jurisdiction in outer space, including the World Meteorological Organization
(“WMO”) and the European Organization for Meteorological Satellites
(“EUMETSAT”). 38
F.

Non-Governmental Commercial Satellite Operators

Non-governmental commercial operators have significant stakes in
regulation of outer space. Examples are INTELSAT, SES, Eutelsat,
INMARSAT, Planet, One Web, etc. Commercial satellite operators are
primarily motivated by profit. For their operation, they need access,
radiofrequencies, orbital slots, and assurance that other commercial operators
will not interfere with their radio frequencies, orbits, and conducting of
business in outer space. Additionally, they need a secure business
environment; space situational awareness, which requires transparency about
other traffic as well as military traffic. They also need to know the locations
of dangerous space debris. Finally, they may require protection from their
governments when pressed by governmental and non-governmental operators
from other countries. Commercial operators assert their interests through trade
organizations and individually in dealings with each other and with
governments.
Non-governmental operators’ profit motivations drive them to compete
fiercely with each other. The intensity of competition among the commercial
satellite operators is illustrated by the recent Space-X application to the U.S.
Federal Communication Commission (“FCC”) to relocate 1484 small
satellites from orbits in the 690–823 mile range from Earth to lower Earth
orbits in the 347-mile range. Several other commercial operators (Planet,
Spire Global, Astro Digital) plan to orbit in the lower range now allocated to
Space-X.39 Consequently, these commercial operators filed protests with the
FCC claiming hardship resulting from the FCC decision, arguing that the
38

Who We Are, EUMETSAT, (Nov. 17, 2019, 12:32 PM), https://www.eumetsat.int/website/home/
AboutUs/WhoWeAre/index.html.
39
LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 223; see Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C § 307 (2004)
(FCC decides whether granting an application is in the public interest); see Irene Klotz, Showdown at LEO:
FCC Approves Lower Orbit for Space-X Satellites, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH. (May. 6, 2019), at 50
[hereinafter Showdown] (Space-X will ultimately launch more than 12,000 satellites); see Irene Klotz, Small
Satellites, Big Data, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH , July 30–Aug. 19, 2018, at 48, 49 [hereinafter Small
Satellites].
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operators of non-navigable small satellites would not be able to change orbits
to avoid conjunctions with the mass of Space-X satellites. The recent FCC
application by Amazon to launch 3,236 satellites will further increase the
congestion and the competition for slots in LEO. 40 Ultimately, ITU will only
clear orbits which are free of radio interference. 41 That may be difficult
because of the multitude of applications for radiofrequencies and related
orbits.42
A variety of trade associations represent non-governmental satellite
operators. Large operators, such as INTELSAT, SES and EUTELSAT,
operating mainly in high Earth orbits, have formed the Space Data Association
to coordinate their common interests. 43 This association has formed
subcommittees on traffic data sharing, safety, procedural developments,
interference with radio frequencies, operations, flight dynamics, and
government liaisons. Other satellite operators, receiving funding from the
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (“DARPA”), have formed the
Consortium for Execution of Rendevouz and Servicing Operations
(“CONFERS”) to coordinate long term sustainability, safety, technical
standards, and satellite flight operations. 44 The Commercial Smallsat
Spectrum Management Association is yet another group of small satellite
companies operating in LEO such as Planet, One Web, and Blacksky. 45 This
association represents the radio spectrum management’s interests of the small
satellite operators in their joint dealings with the FCC and through the FCC
with the International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”).
There are limits to the ability of non-governmental trade associations
to establish order in outer space. They cannot legally agree to limit
competition among themselves.46 They may also be ineffective in regulating
safety for themselves individually and within their trade associations because
of overriding profit motives.47
40

Klotz, Showdown, supra note 39, at 50; see Klotz, Small Satellites, supra note 39, at 48.
See infra Part IV.E for discussion of ITU.
42
See infra Part IV.E.
43
Committees and Working Groups, SPACE DATA ASS’N (June 15, 2015), https://www.spacedata.org/sda/committees-and-working-groups/.
44
CONFER, http://www.satelliteconfers.org/ (last visited June 15, 2019).
45
CSSMA, https://cssma.space/ (last visited June 15, 2015).
46
See infra Part IV.E for discussion of ITU.
47
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 1–7 (2004); Boeing 737 MAX 8 disaster is example of product being
marketed, with FAA acquiescence, before being adequately tested for safety. See Jim Hall and Peter Goetz,
The Boeing 737 Max Crisis Is a Leadership Failure, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 17, 2019),
41

12
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Manufacturers of Space Equipment

Manufacturers of satellites, launch vehicles, or outer space weaponry
who are in the business of supplying outer space equipment have a significant
stake in the successful space operations of their customers. Some of the
manufacturers, such as Space-X, are also operators of space equipment. Space
equipment manufacturers do significant business with domestic as well as
foreign governments; they may have competing interests in the success of the
space activities of different governments. Some of the manufacturers, like
Boeing, Airbus, Lockheed, and Space-X have significant leverage to assert
their stakes in outer space, because of their size. Small manufacturers are
further down the supply line. 48 They assert themselves most effectively
through their trade associations.49
The so-called “military-industrial complex” is an example of how
special interests can assert leverage in outer space. The rapidly growing
military investments in outer space are good business for the manufacturers
of space equipment. Therefore, manufacturers have an interest in continuing
and even increasing their military business. U.S. President Eisenhower, in his
farewell address to the nation in 1961, warned that the joint interests of the
military establishment and the manufacturers of military equipment enables
them to threaten other interests by promoting national investment in military
equipment. 50 The military-industrial complex can apply unique leverage when
marketing space technology, because most space equipment is dual use,
serving both civilian and military sectors. The current military space race
among the United States, Russia, and China encourages the military-industrial
complexes in the competing states to promote military investments. 51 This
competition may result in promoting use of weaponry in outer space and/or to
conduct military activities short of war.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/17/opinion/boeing-737-max.html; see also David Gelles, Boeing Says
Charges Tied to 737 Max Grounding to Reach $8 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 18, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/18/business/boeing-737-charge.html. The disaster is estimated to cost
Boeing $7.8 billion.
48
See Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1961 Farewell Address, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/
doc.php?flash=false&doc=90&page=transcript (last visited July 15, 2019).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Arms Control, supra note 1, at 157.
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The major space powers’ investments in military space technology are
currently increasing. 52 In 2019, the US Department of Defense asked
Congress for a $14.1 billion increase in military space expenditures.53 Russia
and China are engaged in corresponding increases in military spending.54 This
increase in militarization of outer space creates the danger of war in outer
space. Arms control and disarmament would save government spending and
lower international tensions. 55
H.

Scientists and Astronomers

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty’s primary objective is to make possible
exploration of outer space including the Moon and other celestial bodies.56
The space age opened outer space for scientific exploration and created
exciting prospects for astronomical explorations and research. Space scientists
and explorers are important stakeholders who need ample room and
opportunity to acquire and use data without interference from the other
users. 57 Science observation of Earth from outer space is also becoming
increasingly important to understanding how to maintain the health of the
planet.
Scientists and astronomers coordinate extensively though their private
organizations, such as the International Astronomical Union, the Committee
for Space Research (“COSPAR”) and the International Astronautical
Federation. They also coordinate and contribute to the work of the COPUOS
Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on space debris, planetary protection,
and many other outer space issues. Scientific transparency is advantageous for
users of outer space, contributing to expanded scientific exploration of outer
space.
The recent discovery and visualization of black holes at the center of
galaxies illustrates the importance of continuing exploration and discovery.
52

Id.
DiMascio & Hudson, supra note 16.
54
Arms Control, supra note 1, at 156-158.
55
Id.
56
Outer Space Treaty art. I, supra note 6, at 207–08.
57
Id.; see also Jeff Foust, Can Satellite Megaconstellations Be Responsible Users of Space?,
SPACENEWS (Sep. 2, 2019), https://spacenews.com/can-satellite-megaconstellations-be-responsible-usersof-space/ (the President of the American Astronomical Society expressed that he was “very worried” about
lights of small satellites interfering with astronomical observations); Kenneth Chang, NASA Rover on Mars
Detects Puff of Gas That Hints at Possibility of Life, N.Y. TIMES (June 22, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/22/science/nasa-mars-rover-life.html.
53
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Further exploration and discovery are also needed for the protection of the
Earth from threats such as asteroid strikes. Sixty million years ago, the Earth
was struck by an asteroid that extinguished 99.9% of all life on Earth, and it
will be struck by asteroids again. Most asteroids are currently unidentified,
and the danger of collision they pose needs to be established.58 Some asteroids
have been identified and astronomers track their locations.
Scientists have also pointed to the dangers of climate change. The
phenomenon and causes of climate change must be closely observed by
remote sensing from outer space in order to be countered. Observation by
satellite is a major source of information about the effects of climate change
on Earth and whether states are adequately complying with limits on global
warming established by the 2015 Paris Agreement. 59 Many people are and
will be affected by rising seas, increasingly drastic weather patterns, and loss
of arable land. Monitoring of global warming and weather patterns by remote
sensing satellites benefit all people on Earth.
The danger of solar flares is also noted by scientists. Flares may
suddenly disrupt customary electricity services.60 The 1859 Carrington solar
flare event proved the likelihood that the Earth will repeatedly experience the
effects of future solar eruptions. 61 Eruptions will disturb communication and
electrical systems on Earth and in space. The sun must be watched for solar
eruptions so that warnings can be issued and precautions taken. 62 Electronic
equipment needs to be improved to resist interruptions from solar flares.
Scientific observations are further necessary in preparation for the
ultimate transfer of life from Earth to another part of the universe. Scientists
must prepare for the eventual exit from planet Earth when life on Earth
becomes impossible due to global warming, asteroid collision, or when the
Sun eventually burns up. Scientists have recently discovered other planet

58

LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 234–39. See also Regulation, supra note 1, at 104–09, 123–25.
LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 359–86. Parties agreed to limit temperature increases to less
than two degrees in the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change. Paris Agreement, EUROPA.EU,
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/international/negotiations/paris_en (last visited July 26, 2019); Paris
NATIONS,
https://unfccc.int/files/essential_background/
Agreement,
UNITED
convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf (last visited July 15, 2019).
60
Christopher Klein, A Perfect Solar Superstorm: The 1859 Carrington Event, HISTORY (Aug. 22,
2018), https://www.history.com/news/a-perfect-solar-superstorm-the-1859-carrington-event.
61
Id.
62
Id.
59

DECEMBER 2019

OUTER SPACE

15

systems sufficiently close to Earth which can be examined for possible future
habitation.63
I.

The “Average Person” on the Earth

Few people on Earth pay close attention to outer space activities. The
“Average Person” is busy with the events of daily life. Those “average”
people’s eyes are on the Earth, not on the skies. However, events in outer
space can suddenly command attention to these everyday Earthlings. In 2013,
the people in the Siberian city of Chelyabinsk were astonished when they
watched an asteroid explode above their city, breaking every window in the
town. 64 Thousands of people were hurt by flying glass and debris. No one was
killed, although the blast caused significant property damage. Such an asteroid
strike would have caused much more damage if it had happened over New
York City or other heavily inhabited locations. 65
Satellite tracking of life on Earth by GNSS is an example of reliance on
outer space activities. GNSS has revolutionized timing and navigation both
on Earth and in outer space. There are now four global navigation systems,66
and it has been declared to be a “national critical function” by the US
Government. 67 The locations of individual persons are tracked from outer
space by GNSS. 68 Privacy concerns of Average Persons is always at stake
whether or not people know that they are affected. GNSS tracking devices are
connected to people’s telephones and cars, and other equipment is used to
track lost people, children, or animals. GNSS tracking raised criminal
concerns in the case of United States v. Antoine Jones, in which the police
implanted a GNSS device in Mr. Jones’ car and tracked him for an entire
63

See generally CHRISTOPHE GALFARD, THE UNIVERSE IN YOUR HAND: A JOURNEY THROUGH SPACE,
TIME, AND BEYOND 3–50 (2015); Astronomers Are Probing Faraway Planets with Greater Sophistication,
ECONOMIST
(Aug.
3,
2019),
https://www.economist.com/science-andTHE
technology/2019/08/03/astronomers-are-probing-faraway-planets-with-greater-sophistication.
64
Chelvabinsk Meteor, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chelyabinsk_meteor (last visited
May 7, 2019).
65
Regulation, supra note 1, at 196. The Earth has in the past experienced serious asteroid strikes. An
asteroid strike 66 million years ago probably extinguished 99.9% of all life on Earth. It is known that asteroid
strikes will reoccur and that governmental, as well as private, scientists must study the nature and orbits of
asteroids to observe and prepare for the arrival of so-called Near-Earth Objects (“NEOs”) which are the
asteroids most dangerous to Earth
66
LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 337. There are now four global GNSS systems: the U.S. Global
Positioning System (“GPS”), Russian Glonass, European Galileo, and Chinese Beidou.
67
Dee Ann Divis, Homeland Security Says PNT a “National Critical Function”, INSIDE GNSS, (May
6, 2019), https;//insidegnss.com/homeland-security-says-pnt-a-national-crtical-function.
68
Id.
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month without obtaining a warrant from a court.69 Private persons, other than
police, also use GNSS to monitor their children, spouses, and employees.70
Yet another significant use of satellites involves the so-called “unstoppablesurveillance-industrial complex,” 71 which resulted from the 2015 USA
Freedom Act. 72 Active US government surveillance of individuals continues
in spite of the constraints of the USA Freedom Act. A recent report by the
Director of U.S. National Intelligence showed that the organization logged
19.4 million telephone numbers between May and December 2018.73
Satellite surveillance has commercial value. For example, the owner of
a rental car may wish to track its location. Many people have become
dependent on the existence of global navigation systems to navigate roads and
streets. However, the GNSS satellite signals are very weak and are easily
subject to jamming and spoofing. 74
In addition to “average” daily activities, there are global orders that
affect everyone. People on the Earth are generally dependent on the safety and
security provided from outer space. Security of people is affected by military
defense which increasingly includes making decisions about how to employ
military equipment in outer space.
Among the current trends, the Average Person’s interests are not well
represented; there are no organizations promoting such interests. Thought
needs to be given to how best to represent this affected but unrepresented
group, as the impacts of outer space grow. Other stakeholders cannot be
expected to represent them.

69

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2012). See LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 337.
See Paul Larsen, International Regulation of Global Navigation Satellite Systems, 80 J. AIR. L. &
COM. 388, 388–90 (Regulation of GNSS Tracking Private Issues).
71
Steven Nelson, NSA Whistleblowers Oppose Freedom Act, Endorse Long-Shot Bill, U.S. NEWS
(Apr. 27, 2015), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/04/27/nsa-whistleblowers-oppose-freedomact-endorse-long-shot-bill.
72
Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline over
Monitoring Act (USA FREEDOM Act) of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codified as amended in
various sections of 18 and 50 U.S. Code).
73
Charlie Savage, N.S.A. “Unmaskings” of U.S. Identities Soared Last Year, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/30/us/politics/nsa-unmaskings-surveillance-report.html.
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See NAVISP Projects Target SATNAV Interference, EUR. SPACE AGENCY
(Aug. 5, 2019),
http://www.esa.int/Applications/Navigation/NAVISP_projects_target_satnav_interference.
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SHARED OUTER SPACE VALUES

The order for outer space activities should reflect the shared values of
the stakeholders and participants in outer space activities.
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 (“OST”) lists and establishes basic
values agreed to be shared by outer space stakeholders. OST Article VI
provides that these values (“provisions”) shall apply to both government and
nongovernmental activities. These shared values are:
1.

Freedom of scientific exploration75

2.

Free and unrestricted freedom of access to and use of outer
space on the basis of equality 76

3.

Sharing of benefits among all the peoples of the world
regardless of their degree of economic and scientific
development 77

4.

No appropriation of outer space78

5.

Peace in outer space and development of friendly relations
among the world’s peoples and countries 79

New shared values have developed since 1967, caused by congestion
and concerns for safety of outer space activities. Such changes in these basic
values include:

75
76
77
78
79
80
81

1.

Space debris management to prevent foreclosure of outer
space80

2.

Space traffic management to prevent collisions and
interferences with outer space traffic81

Outer Space Treaty art. VI, supra note 6, at 209.
Id.
Id.
Id. See generally RADIO REGULATIONS, supra note 36, arts. 2 & 5.
See Outer Space Treaty arts. I, III, IV, X, & XII, supra note 6, at 207–09.
Mitigation Guidelines, supra note 4.
Id.; cf. Space Policy Directive-3, supra note 7.
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Some shared values regarding uses of outer space are in stages of
development; they are:
1.

Shared guidelines for uses of outer space resources 82

2.

Shared guidelines for human habitation of outer space83

Many values are not shared among stakeholders. It is apparent that the
stakeholders and the existing different orders of outer space uses overlap and
sometimes conflict in places. That will be evident from the following
discussion.
IV.

THE NEW ORDER: COMPETITION FOR DOMINION IN OUTER SPACE

A.

No Order in Outer Space

1.

Precedent: Exploration and Exploitation of the Americas

Outer space is known as the final frontier. It is still being explored and
exploited and parts of it may become the ultimate habitat of humankind.
Discovery of new frontiers brings into comparison similar historical examples
in early Earth explorations. For example, in 1492, Columbus “sailed the ocean
blue”84 and discovered America. Should we follow the example of the Spanish
conquistadores in the Americas? At the time of Columbus, the lust for gold
and silver was the major motivation of Hernan Cortez and his Spanish soldiers
in conquering the land of the Aztec Indians in Mexico.85 That was also the
motivation of Francisco Pizarro in his conquest of the Incas.86 The exploits of
Cortez and Pizarro were authorized by the Kingdom of Spain, which
benefitted from the American riches. The conquests resulted in the disruption
and suppression of the native population. This early exploitation in the
Americas raises the basic issue of whether exploration and exploitation of
outer space should occur without regulation based on the order of first come
first served.

82

See generally Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, supra note 21.
Id.
84
As the classic nursery rhyme goes.
85
See
Christopher
Minster,
10
Notable
Spanish
Conquistadors
Throughout
History, THOUGHTCO (Jul. 3, 2019), https://www.thoughtco.com/the-conquistadors-2136575. See generally
W.H. PRESCOTT, THE CONQUEST OF MEXICO (J.M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 3rd ed. 1965).
86
See generally W.H. PRESCOTT, THE CONQUEST OF PERU (Dolphin Books, 1962).
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Effect of No Order in Outer Space

Exploration unrestricted by order would only serve a few early arriving
outer space stakeholders, to the exclusion of latecomers. Scientific exploration
of outer space would suffer from this model. The first-come explorers would
appropriate valuable resources and leave less for the later explorers.
Consequently, benefits would not be shared. Explorations by the
conquistadores did not result in peaceful relations with the American Indians.
Such freedom of exploitation would be counter to virtually all agreed-upon
existing values and orders in outer space.
Unrestricted exploitation of outer space could have been an option
when outer space access opened with the orbit of Sputnik in 1957. At that
time, only a few stakeholders were involved. However, outer space is now a
more sophisticated environment involving many different stakeholders—both
countries as well as individuals. Thus, the no order option should be discarded;
although it could become the only option if the excessive space debris
forecloses access to outer space.
B.

Astronomers’ and Scientists’ Exploration of Outer Space

1.

Current Order Governing Astronomers’ and Scientists’ Exploration of
Outer Space

The advancement of astronomy and other sciences in outer space is a
widely shared value. We need to understand the universe. Astronomy and
science brought us information about the thirteen-billion-year-old “big bang”
that began the development of the planets and introduced such phenomena as
dark matter and anti-matter. Gravity is another science phenomenon under
continued investigation. The galaxies are in continuous movement circling
around black holes in which yet unknown physical rules apply. 87
Astronomical observations have identified planets which may be habitable by
humans and more such planets are being found. The habitability of the Earth
is endangered by activities such as industrial production of carbon dioxide
causing global warming, which will eventually make the Earth

87

See Dennis Overbye, Darkness Visible, Finally: Astronomers Capture First Ever Image of a Black
Hole, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/10/science/black-hole-picture.html.
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uninhabitable.88 Earth is also endangered by sunspots resulting in excessive
radiation.89
Other dangers to Earth are the hundreds of thousands of asteroids in the
asteroid belt, some of which visited the Earth in the past causing near
extinction of all life forms. Dangerous asteroids, known as near earth objects
(“NEOs”), are gradually being identified with the hope that they can be
diverted before colliding with Earth. 90 The Earth and the solar system, of
which it is part, will collapse in the far future. If humans are alive at that time
they will have left the Earth. Ways to escape from Earth are part of continued
research not only by astronomers but also by philosophers, medical experts,
psychologists, and other scientists who would need to make possible the
transfer of human beings to habitable planets.91 The order that astronomers
and other scientists recommend must be protected from military and
commercial encroachments. Consequently, exploration of outer space has
received legal priority in the OST Article I as follows:
The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in
the interests of all countries irrespective of their degree of
economic or scientific development, and shall be the province of
mankind.
Article I of the OST furthermore guarantees “freedom of scientific
investigation in outer space.” 92 Thus, exploration of outer space is protected
by international law. Outer space research is also protected by national laws.
In 1958, the United States separated outer space research from military
research and activities by establishing NASA. 93
Early participants in outer space exploration assumed space to be
unlimited and thus able to accommodate all uses without limits. Scientific
outer space explorations like Voyager I and II could be launched without
88

See MARTIN REES, ON THE FUTURE: PROSPECTS FOR HUMANITY 37–43 (Princeton Univ. Press,

2018).
89

Id.
David A. Koplow, Exoatmosheric Plowshares: Using a Nuclear Explosive Device for Planet
Defense Against an Incoming Asteroid, 23 UCLA J. INT. L. & FOREIGN. AFFAIRS 76, 81–95 (2018).
91
REES, supra note 88, at 37–43.
92
Outer Space Treaty art. I, supra note 6, at 207–08.
93
See National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426, 426 (1958)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2451(a) (2006)).
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concerns about competing users. Commercial users like INTELSAT,
INMARSAT, SES, the global navigation satellite services (“GNSS”), the
military outer space operators, as well as LANDSAT and other remote sensing
operators all launched without much concern about competing users.
However, they all acknowledge the need for radiofrequencies that are free of
signal interference. Virtually all the states, as parties to the ITU Constitution
Art. 44, now acknowledge that outer space radiofrequencies and related
orbital slots are scarce resources that shall be “used rationally, efficiently and
economically [so that] all countries may have equitable access to both.”94
Many states and operators may continue to view outer space as limitless
and will accommodate all users and uses allowing expansion without
restraints. However, the new commercial space race and the expanding
military uses of outer space have changed the human understanding of how
many activities can be accommodated in the space surrounding the Earth. For
example, there is about to be a stunning change, from approximately 2000
operating satellites in outer space to, as widely expected, many thousands of
operating satellites that will be orbited and deorbited frequently. Furthermore,
military uses of outer space are increasing.95 Some of these activities will be
detrimental to scientific investigations. 96 Space is becoming congested. 97
Need for greater order is evidenced by the United Nations COPUOS space
debris guidelines, now being enforced as mandatory regulations by some
states. 98
2.

Evaluation of Astronomers’ and Scientists’ Access to Outer Space

Exploration of outer space requires adequate funding by governments.
Astronomers and scientists need unhindered access to outer space for
observations and experiments. Conflicts exist between science and other uses
and orders in outer space. An example of commercial interference with
freedom of scientific exploration is the Space-X launch of 12,000 small
satellites to provide internet access. This interferes with radiofrequencies used
by astronomers to map gas in the universe and also with astronomers’
visibility of the stars. Plans by Blue Origin to launch thousands of small
94

ITU Constitution art. 44, supra note 33, at 49.
Deanna Paul, Space: The Final Legal Frontier, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/08/31/space-final-legal-frontier/.
96
Id.
97
LEO Constellations, supra note 1, at 30; see Saadia Pekkanen, The New Space Race, 113 AJIL
Unbound 92, 109 (2019).
98
See discussion infra Part IV.F.
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satellites for competing internet business further threatens scientific activities
in outer space. 99 Likewise, military activities, such as the recent ASAT
destruction of a satellite by India, result in added waves of space debris and
will also interfere with scientific explorations. 100 Moreover, military
dominance of outer space, to the exclusion of other uses, limits scientific
exploration. Continued increase of space debris may ultimately foreclose
access to outer space. Furthermore, any future mining and habitation of
celestial bodies may need protective regulation of their environments to
facilitate future scientific explorations.
Exploration of outer space will continue to be a priority for outer space
activities. Other stakeholders, including commercial and military operations,
must allow room for science exploration. That includes both ample support
for science activities and interference-free space for scientific observations
and experiments. Congestion of small satellites in LEO may preclude
astronomy in outer space. If so, then governments must take this issue into
consideration in authorizing launches.
C.

Viewing Outer Space as a Global Commons

1.

Potential Order Based on Global Commons Principle

The concept of a global commons is linked to Art. I of the Outer Space
Treaty statement that outer space is free for use by all states. The original idea
of common ownership of land is associated with the historic existence of the
agricultural ‘commons’ in English villages. The agricultural commons idea
later applied to international global commons resources such as the high seas,
air, and outer space. If viewed as a global commons, the common uses of all
outer space would be respected. Military strategists believe the global
commons concept allows their uses. 101

99

Shannon Hall, After SpaceX Starlink Launch, a Fear of Satellites That Outnumber All Visible Stars,
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Some economists have contrasted the idea of the commons with the
idea of private ownership, arguing that private ownership is the more
productive use of property and thus a logical and desirable replacement for
common ownership.102 This free market economy line of thinking might lead
the reader to conclude that individual commercial exploitation of
unappropriated outer space is a preferable model for order in outer space.
However, past experience with private enterprise exploitation of fisheries in
the ocean global commons led to overfishing and mismanagement of ocean
resources. As such, economist Elinor Ostrom suggests eight requirements for
successful management of common property: 103

102

1.

Clearly defined boundaries.

2.

Congruence between appropriation and provision rules
and local conditions.

3.

Collective-choice arrangements allowing for the
participation of most of the appropriators in the decisionmaking process.

4.

Effective monitoring by monitors who are part of or
accountable in the appropriations.

5.

Graduated sanctions for appropriators who do not respect
community rules.

6.

Conflict-resolution mechanisms which are cheap and easy
to access

7.

Minimal recognition of rights to organize (e.g., by
government authorities)

See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
Jay Walljasper, Elinor Ostrom’s 8 Principles for Managing a Commons, COMMONS MAG.: ON THE
COMMONS (Oct. 2, 2011), http://www.onthecommons.org/magazine/elinor-ostroms-8-principles-managingcommmons#sthash.btEJhHrA.dpbs; see also Simon Fairlie, A Short History of Enclosure in Britain, THE
LAND, http://www.thelandmagazine.org.uk/articles/short-history-enclosure-britain (visited July 16, 2019);
The Hague International Space Resources Governance Working Group, INT’L INST. OF AIR AND SPACE LAW,
https://www.universiteitleiden.nl/en/law/institute-of-public-law/institute-of-air-space-law/the-hague-spaceresources-governance-working-group.
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In case of large common property management protocols:
Organization in the form of multiple layers of protocols.

Two international management arrangements would satisfy the
management criteria proposed by Professor Ostrom. 104 First, the ITU Radio
Regulations Board is the universally accepted international management of a
global resource, the radiofrequencies. As described below, the ITU Board
supervises international allocation and registration of radio frequencies. The
international management of this global resource is particularly relevant
because it is founded on the assumption that the receiving satellite operators
do not become owners of the allocated radiofrequencies and related orbits.
They merely obtain use. Thus, ownership of global commons resources, such
as lunar mining, is not an issue. Second, another international common
resource management arrangement is that of deep-sea mining of the oceans
arranged by the 1994 Protocol to the Law of the Seas (“LOS”) Convention.
The high seas, like outer space, are not subject to national appropriation by
claims of sovereignty. Briefly, the 1994 LOS Protocol establishes: (1) a
management council that would include the United States, with voting rights
commensurate with its economic interests; (2) a managing council which will
not unduly limit productivity; (3) no direct transfer of technology
requirement; (4) access to commercial opportunities on a first come first
served basis; (5) a reasonable management fee, and (6) market oriented
management policies.105 The United States accepted the 1994 Protocol but has
not yet ratified it because the market demand for deep sea mining has not
developed as hoped.106 Adoption of either of these two international resource
management arrangements for outer space have the benefit of avoiding
ruinous disputes over desirable market opportunities. Unilateral regulation of
commercial activities in outer space is not effective because outer space is not
sovereign. International agreement or consensus can establish an orderly
marketplace. Managed uses of the global commons could also ease spoliation
of outer space resources.
Outer space is fragile. Unlike Earth, outer space is not able to heal itself
from abuses such as deposits of space debris of space objects launched from

104

See discussion infra Part IV.E.
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Earth. Overall management is needed.107 The vastness of outer space is no
longer sufficient reason to allow unlimited uses. Mismanagement of outer
space resources is a current and increasing problem to the extent that it
threatens to foreclose access to outer space.108 The Kessler syndrome foretells
that the dangerous increases in space debris will impede and eventually stop
access to outer space. 109 Intentional destruction of satellites by China, the
United States, and, most recently, India have exacerbated the space debris
problem. 110 Another problem is the scarcity of suitable slots in the
geostationary orbit that is already populated by many military and
communications satellites, in mid-Earth orbit as well as global navigation
satellite systems. Certain low-earth orbits are already populated by remote
sensing and communications satellites.111
a.

Evaluation of the Global Commons Principle

The global commons order of non-sovereign outer space is based on the
idea that outer space cannot be appropriated by any one state or commercial
enterprise. It is free for use by military as well as civilian users.112 Outer space
is inherently common and should be accepted as such. A global commons
regime for outer space would be subject not only to the management of its
users, but also to existing laws and regulations. A managed global commons
would support continued scientific exploration, while providing unrestricted
freedom of access to the users. It would share outer space benefits among the
users. It could resolve current conflicts among states about the right to own
and exploit the resources including mining of celestial bodies. However, it
could conflict with demands of military authorities who view outer space as
an exclusive military domain. Similar to the discussion about the English
commons, a big issue raised is whether common management of outer space
resources can match or do better than unilateral private enterprise. In the past,
under commercial management, there has been excessive exploitation of non-
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sovereign resources such as over-fishing of the oceans, and exhaustive mining
of resources.
Ultimately, there needs to be international agreement on space resource
management in order that mining of the Moon and all other celestial bodies
can proceed. Two management options are suggested: (1) Creation of an
intentional management council modeled on the ITU Radio Regulations
Board that avoids the issue of direct ownership, or (2) management drawing
on experience with the 1994 Law of the Seas Protocol.113
Existing users recognize the need for overall management of space
debris and space traffic.114 The huge increase in the number of satellites in
outer space expected in the next ten years has made management of all the
moving satellites in outer space a major concern. 115 Some aspects of outer
space are already subject to international management. For example, the
commercial uses of radiofrequencies and related orbits are subject to
international control through the International Telecommunication Union
(ITU) which organizes the use of radiofrequencies and related orbits for all
satellites. 116
D.

Outer Space Order Established by Current International and National
Law

1.

Existing International Legal Order 117

Outer Space is not “lawless” and open to unbridled exploitation by
conquistadors like the Americas were in the 1500s. In 1967 the United Nations
adopted as fundamental doctrine that outer space must be governed by
international law. 118 Importantly, a foundational framework governing outer
space was established by the Outer Space Treaty. 119 The OST is in the nature
113
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of a constitution for outer space rather than a minutely-detailed law
establishing order in outer space. Importantly, the OST preamble explains that
its objective is to further space exploration and use for the benefit of all the
peoples of the world.120 Article I states that the Treaty’s priority is discovery
and exploration and that uses of outer space must be based on equality of states
and be used for the benefit of humankind. Free access to outer space is
guaranteed. Additionally, Article II provides that outer space is not subject to
national appropriation by states.121 The OST is a framework, the details of
which will be filled in by further international and national law, including
standards and guidelines. An example of such further implementation would
be the establishment of an order in outer space that resolves the current traffic
congestion caused by the huge increase in moving objects.
The focus of the OST was on governmental rather than on nongovernmental outer space activities. Arguments have been made that nongovernmental operators are outside the Treaty because they are not
specifically mentioned in Art II. However, that argument is not accepted by
states. OST, Art. VI clearly provides that OST binds non-governments as well
as governmental entities. The States are obligated to apply all the provisions
of the Treaty to all its national non-governmental commercial operators.
Accordingly, governments are required by the treaty to authorize and
continuously supervise all nongovernmental activities in outer space.
Furthermore, Art. III of the OST makes international law, in particular
the UN Charter, applicable in outer space. OST Art. IV restricts military uses
of outer space. Art IV prohibits placing nuclear weapons and other weapons
of mass destruction in orbit around the Earth and it demilitarizes all celestial
bodies. Thus, at the time of its adoption, the OST was considered the most
important disarmament treaty since WWII. 122
OST Art. VII makes states internationally liable for all damages caused
by any space objects which they launch or procure to be launched. Under Art.
VIII, states retain jurisdiction over objects that they launch into outer space
and Art. IX provides that States must pay due regard to each other regarding
120
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their activities while in outer space. The Liability Convention further regulates
the liability of outer space activities.123 The Registration Convention requires
all space objects to be nationally and internationally registered for
identification purposes. 124
This is a thumbnail sketch describing the basic applicable international
law order to which all outer space activities are subject. In implementing the
OST, States have further agreed to be subject to generally applicable
international regulations limiting the amount of space debris that their outer
space activities may cause. 125 Also, outer space activities will likely be subject
to STM and other generally applicable rules of behavior in order to make
possible the large mixture of space activities expected to exist in the future.126
The outer space treaties have been generally adopted by all the space
faring states as well as by all other interested states, thus raising an expectation
that they are so generally accepted that they have become customary
international law. In fact, some of these treaty principles have already been
declared customary international law. As such they become universally
applicable. 127
2.

National Legal Order

In 2013 COPUOS prepared, and the UN General assembly adopted, its
Recommendations on National Legislation Relevant to the Peaceful
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, UNGA Res. 68/74. Consequently, many
countries adopted national laws implementing the space law treaties in
varying forms. 128 A number of countries, for example India, simply make the
international space law treaties apply directly without adoption of
implementing national laws. Whereas, other states directly apply their
national laws to govern the outer space activities of both governmental and
non-governmental space objects.
The United States implemented most of the OST by national law,
establishing basic governmental regulation and supervision by the Federal
123
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Aviation Administration (“FAA”) of all non-governmental launches of space
objects. Although the U.S. Constitution Article VI makes international treaties
“the Supreme Law of the Land,” 129 U.S. space launch laws presently only
require governmental authorization for launches and reentry of satellites.130
Importantly, the governmental licensing process makes it possible for the
government to influence the establishment of order among all space’s
competing interests. The United States is expected to adopt regulations
governing the activities of non-governmental operators in outer space as well.
Furthermore, U.S. satellite operators are subject to FCC regulations of
radiofrequencies and related orbits used by non-governmental operators while
in outer space. The FCC issues radiofrequency licenses to satellite operators
in accordance with its determination whether granting a license is in the public
interest. 131 Thus, the FCC can influence order among the competing interests
in outer space.
It can happen that Individual states adopt laws governing activities of
their non-governmental operators that interpret and potentially conflict with
the Outer Space Treaty’s rights of free use of outer space. For example,
Luxembourg went further by adopting legislation approving appropriation of
outer space resources by individual states and operators. The United States
has tried to limit such potential conflicts by prescribing that national space
laws shall be applied so as to conform with international laws, but some other
nations have questioned its compliance. 132
National regulation authorizing outer space activities raises the
question of whether individual states authorizing non-governmental operators
to launch satellites also possess the resources to supervise its authorized
operators, thus enforcing its regulations in outer space. 133 The large space
powers such as the United States, Russia, and China, have ample enforcement
resources, but many small states do not have sufficient enforcement resources.
Nevertheless, under the Outer Space Treaty, all member states have equal
129
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authority under Art. VI to authorize access to and use of outer space by nongovernmental operators. That raises the possibility of rogue nongovernmental operators from other states obtaining operating authorization
from so-called “flag-of-convenience” states that do not have adequate
regulation and enforcement capabilities. 134 For example, a flag-ofconvenience state may authorize launch of dangerously fragile foreign
satellites likely to fail or disintegrate into debris in outer space. The rapidly
increasing volume of space debris increases danger of collisions with satellites
in outer space.135
3.

Evaluation
a. International Space Law

The 1967 Outer Space Treaty established the basic order for outer space
activities. However, it needs to be updated to meet current and future
requirements. Such activities include many current outer space uses, such as
mining on celestial bodies, space debris accumulation, space traffic
management, and liability for collisions and other interference. Uniform
international standards and recommended practices must be allowed to
develop for these activities.
International space law was adopted in the early part of the outer space
age when the adopting states did not foresee the future development of nongovernmental satellite operations in outer space. 136 Space technology has
developed rapidly since then. Failure of the Moon Agreement to attract major
space powers shows the difficulty of coming to international agreement in the
current space age. There is urgent need for international agreement on doing
business in outer space and diminishing the military space race. The
prospective plans for humans to live in outer space require international
agreement. It is as if the world is waiting for some major disaster in outer
space to happen before the states can accept the need for further international
agreement about their co-existence in outer space.
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National Space Law

International space law requires compliance by the states. National
legal enforcement and implementation of international law is an important
way for the governments to influence order among the competing outer space
interests. However, divergent national interpretations of the existing
international legal framework are beginning to develop. The reason is that new
space technology and outer space uses have developed subsequent to adoption
of the existing legal principles. There will be increasing confusion as these
interpretations bump up against one another. 137
The individual states will have important functions to enforce and
implement international standards and recommended practices. That will
include significant opportunities to establish order among the competing
interests in outer space.
E.

Regulation of Outer Space by the International Telecommunication
Union138

1.

ITU Order

For numerous reasons, radio frequencies are limited outer space
resources. Besides a state’s need for exclusive frequencies, only higher range
radio frequencies can be used for satellite communication and navigation.
Another reason is the huge and increasing demand for frequencies.
Furthermore, military use of frequencies is not subject to ITU regulation. The
ITU will only recognize and register cleared radiofrequencies in its Master
International Frequency Register. 139 The Master International Frequency
Register is the only registry of international frequencies in the world and the
competition for registration is intense. Satellite operators must check the ITU
registry for radiofrequencies that are free of harmful interference before
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applying for use of a specific frequency. Thus, the ITU Register is extremely
useful in planning future outer space activities. But
Radio frequencies and related orbits are subject to final regulation and
allocation by the individual ITU member states. Potential conflict exists that
radiofrequencies used by 5G wireless signals may significantly interfere with
weather satellites’ data collection. 140 The US Federal Communication
Commission has begun to auction off frequencies for 5G service that could
result in interference with weather satellites. The FCC plans to deregulate and
expedite frequency applications by small satellites. 141 The ITU becomes
concerned when one state’s frequency assignments affect, overlap, or in other
ways cause harmful interference with assignment of radio frequencies by
another state. The competing countries and operators may negotiate among
themselves for use of specific frequencies in order to file for cleared
frequencies in the ITU Register. One solution for competing requests for
frequencies may be for one applicant to agree to become a secondary user
accessing a frequency only to the extent that it does not interfere with the
frequency use of the primary user. 142
The ITU Radio Regulations Board administers the rules of procedure
for frequency registrations.143 The Board maintains oversight of the ITU staff,
which administers registrations into the International Frequency Register. The
Board consists of no more than twelve members who are nationals of ITU
members, but they must all be of different nationalities. Individual members
may not participate in any matters affecting their own states. 144 The Board is
elected by the ITU Plenipotentiary Conference from among the ITU members.
These members are required to have the expertise necessary to conduct their
technical duties and administer the rules governing registrations. Ultimately,
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the Board maintains oversight of registrations to avoid harmful interferences
with already registered frequencies.
While the ITU authorizes registration of radio frequencies free of
harmful interference on a first-come first-served basis, 145 there are restrictions
and qualifications. The 1979 ITU Administrative Radio Conference 146
clarified that the states, and in turn their authorized operators, do not own
allocated radio frequencies and related orbital slots.147 Allocated ownership
would be contrary to OST Article II, which prohibits permanent appropriation
of outer space. Furthermore, the 1985–1988 ITU World Administrative Radio
Conferences pre-allocated one orbital slot on the GSO to each state for direct
broadcast purposes. However, the Conferences did not recognize the claims
of the Bogota Declaration countries to sovereign rights in the GSO. 148 It is
also important to note the constitutional mandate in Article 44 that allocations
shall be distributed “rationally, efficiently and economically” 149 and that the
special needs of the developing countries must be taken into consideration in
the distribution of radiofrequencies and related orbital slots.
2.

Evaluation

Decision-making in the ITU is independent of and differs from that of
COPUOS. The ITU regulates only radiofrequencies and related orbits. It is
governed by its separate legal regime reflecting its values, only. Thus, the ITU
does not necessarily share the same outer space values that are linked to the
OST listed in Part Two above. ITU’s decision-making may differ or even
conflict with that of COPUOS. Secondly, the ITU regime affects only nonmilitary frequencies, although military authorities tend to pay attention to
ITU’s register of frequencies for reasons of safety. Thirdly, non-governmental
communication satellite operators have considerable influence through their
participation in the ITU sectors. Thus, the distribution of frequencies may be
influenced by nongovernmental operators.
The ITU serves the unique function of making satellite navigation
possible through its oversight of radiofrequencies used for the navigation of
satellites. Satellite operators can operate in outer space thanks to the ITU
145
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provision of radiofrequencies free of radio interference. Radio interference is
a violation of the ITU legal regime, but the ITU does not have a police force
to enforce its regulations. Regulation enforcement is mainly the responsibility
of individual states that are under great pressure to provide licenses for the
large number of small satellites now being launched. The temptation to launch
without an FCC license is great, but enforcement must prevail to prevent
dangerous chaos. 150
F.

Military Order of Outer Space

1.

Military Regime

Military users form yet another order in outer space. Its special rules
can conflict with other uses and orders. U.S., Chinese, and Russian military
authorities consider outer space to be an operational “military domain.” 151
This is further evidence of the fragmented uses and regulations of outer space,
resulting in potentially conflicting uses. Outer space provides military
strategists with the proverbial high grounds from which to dominate the
Earth’s surface.152 Unilateral domination of outer space to the exclusion of
other users is particularly valued. Weaponry may be stationed in outer space
to destroy weaponry of others in outer space or to strike the Earth. Ballistic
missiles may be launched from Earth’s surface to strike targets in outer space
or on distant places on the Earth. Additionally, outer space is very important
for gathering intelligence by remote sensing satellites about other states’
deployment of weaponry and plans for military actions. Most outer space
equipment can be used for both military and civilian activities.
Military activity in outer space is increasing drastically because the
United States, Russia and China are competing with each other without
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constraints. 153 Military authorities consider access to outer space to be
increasingly competitive as well as dangerously congested.154 Lately India,
France, and Japan have joined the competition.155 Consequently, the military
uses of outer space easily overlap and compete with uses of outer space by
other orders. New military competitors are reacting to the domination of the
outer space high ground by the three major space powers. Countries other than
the United States, Russia, and China feel insecure and consequently have
begun to acquire military outer space capabilities. 156 India’s anti- satellite test
is evidence of the growing military counterspace movement. 157 The growth of
military technology also results in competition and possible friction with
commercial satellite operators who are also expanding their outer space
activities. 158
Military use is subject to a special set of treaties, agreements and rules
such as the Rules of War and the Limited Test Ban Treaty. 159 In particular, it
is subject to the peacekeeping rules of the UN Charter and, in turn, subject to
the peacekeeping oversight of the UN Security Council. In this context, it is
important that the Article 103 of the UN Charter provides that the UN Charter
will prevail over other treaties in the event of a conflict. Thus, in the event of
a conflict between the UN Charter and the Outer Space Treaty or the 1963
Test Ban Treaty, the decisions of the UN Security Council will apply and be
enforced. 160
Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, individual states retain the right of
self-defense in outer space. 161 Thus, states may deter unfriendly activities of
153
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other states consistent with Article 51. However, the legal right of self-defense
is not unlimited. The right of self-defense exists only until the UN Security
Council takes measures to maintain international peace and security. Threats
to use force in outer space are subject to Security Council jurisdiction under
the UN Charter Chapter VII. 162 As a practical matter, the Security Council will
need time to evaluate disputed situations before making decisions. In the
meantime, Article 51’s authority controls, meaning that individual states
retain the right to engage in military outer space activities.
Arms control is a fundamental part of the Outer Space Treaty; former
United States President Lyndon B. Johnson characterized the Outer Space
Treaty as the “most important arms control development” of the Cold War.163
OST Article I requires outer space to be used for the benefit of all people. This
article adds to the specific restrictions in Articles II, III, IV, VI, and IX. Article
II prohibits military appropriation of celestial bodies. Article III makes outer
space, including celestial bodies, subject to both the UN Charter and
international treaties on maintaining international peace and security. Article
VI permits “use of military personnel for scientific research or for any other
peaceful purposes” on celestial bodies. 164 Significantly, the United States
interprets the OST to apply to non-aggressive uses of outer space rather than
to non-military uses, thus allowing military uses that are not aggressive.165
Article IV prohibits the placement of weapons of mass destruction in orbit and
demilitarizes all celestial bodies. Article VI requires states to not only comply
with the OST, but also to ensure that their non-governmental bodies comply
with the OST. Furthermore, Article IX requires states to pay “due regard” to
the corresponding interests of other states in outer space166
The Liability Convention Article II holds states liable for the loss of life
and property damages on the Earth’s surface and air that are caused to other
states and their nongovernmental entities. Article III makes states similarly
liable for outer space damages, but this assessment is based on a finding of
162
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fault. Thus, Chinese and Indian ASATS in outer space would be subject to
liability for damages. Furthermore, the Registration Convention requires UN
registration of all space objects, including military space objects. 167
Military uses are subject to several special international treaty
obligations. The United States and other countries operate under the Law of
Armed Conflict in outer space activities in accordance with DOD Directive
2311.O1E. The DOD Manual provides that the Law of Armed Conflict
regulates “the conduct of hostilities in outer space.”168 Other states may or
may not agree with the United States. The United States applies the Law of
Armed Conflict to confrontations short of war; however, such application is
subject to the legal requirement of proportionality of responses. 169 The OST
Article IV prohibition on deployment of weapons of mass destruction in
Earth’s orbit, including celestial bodies, and demilitarization of celestial
bodies allows the individual state some flexibility to do as it wishes. The
United States takes advantage of this flexibility, although it involves risk of
conflict. 170
Outer space military technology is primarily concentrated in four space
powers: United States, Russia, China and now India. 171 That leaves the
remaining countries in the position of being subject to the predominance of
these four countries. Historically, the United States has predominated in outer
space, but is now being challenged by the other powers. These countries
compete fiercely for military dominance over the non-sovereign outer space.
The competing countries have, or are in the process of establishing,
specialized military space forces similar to the United States’ Army, Navy,
and Air Force. The reason for this development is that outer space is no longer
peaceful but “has become a battle ground where the ability to destroy satellites
is a key capability in warfare.”172 One United States decisionmaker states that
governments must now be able to recognize the necessity of a special military
167

Registration Convention, supra note 6; LYALL & LARSEN, supra note 14, at 463. However,
inadequate national compliance remains a problem, see infra text accompanying note 216.
168
U.S. GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEP’T. OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL ¶ 14.10.4 (2016),
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoD%20Law%20of%20War%20Manual%20%20June%202015%20Updated%20Dec%202016.pdf?ver=2016-12-13-172036-190.
169
King & Blank, supra note 151, at 127.
170
Id.
171
See Jeff Faust, NASA Warns Indian Anti-Satellite Test Increased Debris Risk to ISS, supra note 100.
172
See Dominic Gates, Defense Official Talks Space Force and How Military Will Leverage Tech
Giants, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.seattletimes.com/business/deputy-defensesecretary-talks-space-force-and-how-military-will-leverage-local-tech-giants/. See also Space Policy
Directive-4, supra note 151.

38

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 1

space force to defend the nation and to protect space commerce and civil space
exploration. 173
Each space power increases its military presence commensurate with
increases of its competitors. This competition results in continued escalation.
ASAT exercises in outer space by these states have resulted in substantial
increases in space debris. Further military activities will have additional
detrimental effect to the extent that it could trigger the Kessler Syndrome, 174
which forecasts an ultimate foreclosure of access to outer space due to space
debris. Foreclosure of access into outer space would also cause future
foreclosure for military weaponry. The alternative would be to enter into
agreement on outer space arms control but leave room for remote sensing.
Such agreement could best be negotiated directly among the four space
powers. However, military uses of outer space are a core aspect of the general
arms race; it is so integrated into other military systems that they are difficult
to select out for special arms control.175
2.

Evaluation

Military uses tend to exclude other uses and easily conflict with nonmilitary uses of outer space. Military uses consider outer space to be “military
domain,” subject to the Law of Armed Conflict, rather than space law
governing non-military activities. Different rules apply in outer space for the
military. 176 Thus, peace in outer space and development of friendly relations
among the world’s peoples and countries are not the prevailing military value.
The Outer Space Treaty can be preempted. Article 103 of the UN Charter
makes the Charter preeminent of other treaties and therefore enables the UN
Security Council to prevail over the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. UN
Charter Article 51 allows the individual countries the right of military selfdefense if attacked. The OST itself is subject to special interpretation for
military uses, because countries, like the United States and other militarily
powerful countries, interpret the OST Article IV provision on peaceful uses to

173
See Jeff Foust, Cruz Criticizes House for Lack of Action on Commercial Space Legislation,
SPACENEWS (Oct. 31, 2019), https://spacenews.com/cruz-criticizes-house-for-lack-of-action-oncommercial-space-legislation/.
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mean non-aggressive rather than non-military uses. That interpretation would
limit the scope of the OST. 177
Military activities, such as the destruction of a Chinese satellite by a
Chinese ASAT and the recent destruction of an Indian satellite by an Indian
anti-satellite missile, have greatly increased space debris of the sort that can
lead to the ultimate foreclosure of outer space as predicted by the Kessler
Syndrome. 178 Such added space debris also presents increased collision
danger for all non-military space traffic.
A final source of conflict between military and other uses and orders in
outer space is that military and civilian uses are discussed and decided in
different UN fora. Military uses are discussed and decided in the UN
Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Civilian matters are discussed in
COPUOS located in Vienna, Austria. These separable fora may lead to further
difference in sharing of outer space values.179
The claimed military domain is now expanding at the expense of nonmilitary activities. Until recently, military presence in outer space was mostly
concentrated in the geostationary orbit. Military presence is moving into the
low Earth orbit, which is already congested with commercial and scientific
activities, such as the International Space Station. United States announced
that outer space is the next war-fighting domain and US military experts now
regard outer space as a “degraded and operationally-limited environment”
where it contests with other users. 180 The expansion of military order at the
expense of other uses is potentially a serious problem, because (1) it tends to
be exclusive, and (2) exclusive claims are not legitimate in non-sovereign
outer space. There are, however, modifying factors. In times of peace, the
military makes extensive use of non-military uses, such as civilian
communication and reconnaissance satellites. Secondly, the military tends to
observe civilian operating procedures for reasons of safety.
177
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The Commercial Order in Outer Space

1.

Light Touch Commercial Space Order

VOL. 29 NO. 1

The light touch commercial approach is presently advocated for by the
United States National Space Council, and is implemented by government
agencies as mandated by the 2018 United States Space Policy Directives 2
and 3.181 This commercial approach stresses the importance of accepting the
lead of the commercial operators in outer space order, because “the rules and
values of space, like every frontier, will be written by those who get there
first.”182 The thinking is that free enterprise and its profit-making objective
should be the basic values reflected in any regulation of outer space activities.
Any existing restrictive regulation should be treated with a light touch
regulatory approach that assures national freedom of action and maximizes
the industry’s ability to innovate. 183 This approach is designed to establish a
stable environmental for commercial activities. The commercial light touch
model, applicable to govern the private practices of the commercial space
industry, would also be applied to governmental military operators.184 Such
liberal regulation of commercial outer space activities would be extended to
military “friends and allies.”185
The 2015 United States Commercial Space Launch Competition Act,186
is stated as an example of light touch commercial order.187 It expresses current
United States policy. The Act grants United States citizens the right to keep
“space resources” as their private property. 188 The Act asserts conformation
181

Presidential Memorandum on Space Policy Directive-2, Streamlining Regulations On Commercial
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license for all types of commercial space flight launch and re-entry operations; and, (ii) replacing prescriptive
requirements in the commercial space flight launch and re-entry licensing process with performance-based
criteria); Space Policy Directive-3, supra note 7 (mandating that “the US Government should streamline
processes and reduce regulatory burdens that could inhibit commercial sector growth and innovation”); see
also Dr. Scott Pace, Exec. Sec’y, Nat’l Space Council, Keynote Address at the IISL Galloway Space Law
Symposium (Dec. 13, 2017).
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Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 13, 1970), available at
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with United States obligations under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty Article VI
to authorize and supervise non-governmental commercial operators. 189 The
intent of the United States’ space policy is to adopt United States non-binding
light touch governmental regulations that the Government hopes will become
adopted by international consensus rather than through new treaty obligations.
This space policy model firmly rejects the idea that outer space constitutes a
global commons, or that it is a ‘common good.”190 In granting launch licenses,
the FAA has been obligated to enforce United States treaty obligations under
the Outer Space Treaty, in addition to enforcing existing national laws on
health, safety, and national security, resulting in a balance of interests from
launch to reentry in addition to the public interest.
In the Presidential Space Policy Directive 2, the FAA on April 15, 2019
proposed new space launch regulations, liberalizing United States launch and
reentry licensing regulations. All launch and reentry regulations will be placed
in one part—14 CFR Part 450. This would result in licensing regulations
becoming more flexible. New commercial satellite operators, such as SpaceX and Blue Origin, continue to push for more flexibility. More flexibility
would keep more safety-related decisions within the industry, basing
regulations more on operator performance rather than on FAA prescriptive
requirements. These commercial operators argue that space flight is
comparable to air travel and thus can be regulated in the methods. However,
outer space safety is a crucial issue because of the increasing congestion.
Furthermore, the FAA’s recent safety certification experience with the Boeing
737 Max 8 may well influence the final outcome of this rulemaking, because
negligent licensing by a launching state may trigger governmental liability of
the launching state under the Liability Convention.191 Safety is of fundamental
value to both military and civilian operations in outer space.
Under the light touch commercial order approach, there would be
adequate room for commercial operators to conclude agreements or contracts
among themselves to regulate their commercial and operational activities with
each other. Under this scheme, one author suggests that commercial operators
189
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Id.; see discussion of global commons model infra Part IV.C.
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could create a system of private law by initially contracting among companies
regarding all aspects of outer space activities. 192Therefore, hypothetically, one
operator would contract for the launch of space objects; another operator
would agree to operate the objects in outer space; a third operator would
purchase the same space object for a different business purpose; and finally, a
fourth operator would be hired to service the space object while in space. Each
of these contractors could be of different nationality. Contracts would provide
which country’s laws govern specific tasks. Blocktrain contracts would
supplement existing international law. 193 Such agreements would be
delimited by existing international and national laws, such as national antitrust and anti-competition regulations.194
An argument in favor of this commercial approach would be that it
would allow maximum room for initiatives of visionaries like Elon Musk,
who is actively preparing for human exploration and settlement of the planet
Mars. His commercial company, Space-X, is a main United States link to the
International Space Station and to exploring Mars. Another such visionary and
innovator is Amazon’s Chief Executive Officer, Jeff Bezos, 195 whose
commercial space company initiated reusable space launch technology. This
company, Blue Origin, is also planning for possible migration of humans to
other planets as life on Earth becomes more and more difficult. Both Musk
and Bezos are able and willing to use their own ample resources to fund their
visions for outer space. Without their visionary activities, some new space
technology and plans might not come into existence. Furthermore, their
concentrated focus on outer space development maintains a stability in space
development that annually appropriated government funds tend to lack.
The commercial approach would be to the advantage of the states most
equipped for and interested in commercial exploitation of outer space, such as
the United States, Luxembourg, Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and
Germany, which have a keen interest in facilitating space activities by non-
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governmental commercial operators. However, it may conflict with the
military’s view of its exclusive domain order. 196
2.

Evaluation of the Light Touch Commercial Space Order

Commercial placement of thousands of satellites in low Earth orbit may
interfere with scientific observation and exploration of outer space in the same
way the astronomers complained about Space-X. 197 The commercial light
regulatory approach would maximize innovation and freedom of commercial
enterprise. The light regulation would be primarily linked to regulation by
individual states, such as the United States, although all governments would
be obligated to apply existing international laws and regulations. However,
making free enterprise the first priority of outer space may conflict with legal
orders prohibiting appropriation of outer space resources, particularly if
appropriation is unilateral. Such a prioritization may also conflict with
environmental orders restricting debris generation. Unregulated uses and
orbits may interfere with ITU regulation of non-military radiofrequencies and
related orbital slots. 198 Additionally, another potential problem with light
touch commercial order is that if commercial activities and consequent light
touch regulation prioritizes profit over safety of human life, it may interfere
with outer space navigation by multiple competitors. 199 Additionally, outer
space order based on the profit motive may deviate from the Outer Space
Treaty’s Article I mandate of sharing benefits among people across the world,
regardless of their degree of economic and scientific development.200
The light touch commercial order advocated by the United States tends
to view outer space in terms of national interests. However, the large space
industries such as Boeing, Amazon, Space-X, and Airbus are basically
international companies interested in international commerce. Outer space
business is inherently international. It would be impossible for one country to
establish light touch international commercial order for all international space
commerce.
As indicated in recent COPUOS discussions, many developing
countries do not share the United States’ preference for light touch regulation
196
197
198
199
200

See supra Part IV.F.
Klotz, Showdown, supra note 39.
See supra Part IV.E.
See supra text accompanying note 40 (discussing Boeing 737 Max 8).
Outer Space Treaty art. I, supra note 6 at 207–08.
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of outer space commerce. 201 Dominion of the developed countries is resented,
even though companies like One Web link African users to the internet.202
The light touch commercial approach can conflict with space orders
based on other values ranging from science, military, environment, safety, and
international law. The light touch commercial order is primarily linked to
United States policy. It would have to be internationally coordinated so as not
to conflict with other national orders. Furthermore, it must be subject to the
international environmental codes and guidelines.
H.

International Codes and Guidelines for Outer Space Activities

1.

Top-down View of Codes and Guidelines

A variety of rules, guidelines, standards and practices have been, and
will continue to be, adopted for activities by states and nongovernmental
entities in non-sovereign outer space. Examples include the Code of Conduct
proposed by the European states, 203 the 2019 Guidelines for the Long-term
Sustainability of Outer Space Activities, 204 and the 2007 Space Debris
Mitigation Guidelines drafted by the Inter-Agency Space Coordination
Committee (“IADC”), adopted by COPUOS and approved by U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 62/217.205 These are international management rules in
process of adoption by groups of individual states to establish common rules
for their interactions in outer space. The underlying idea behind these rules is
that it is in the self interest of all parties to be able to use outer space without
interference from other parties.
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European Union’s Proposed Code of Conduct for Outer Space206
a. EU Code of Conduct

The EU’s proposed Code of Conduct would establish Rules of the Road
for outer space traffic. By following these rules, operators would know the
locations of all space objects and be able to predict their movements. Both
governmental and non-governmental operators would be subject to the rules.
States, and in turn their authorized non-governmental operators, would agree
to reduce risky activities that could result in harmful interference with other
operators. Transparency and space situational awareness would be essential
parts of the Code of Conduct. A central communications center would be
established through which operators would be able to ascertain the locations
and movements of other operators. 207
b.

Evaluation

The application of the proposed code to military outer space operations
made states leery of becoming disadvantaged in the outer space arms race.
Thus, this code is currently not moving toward completion.208 It is mentioned
in this context because the Code expresses a need for comprehensive
international order in outer space. It may very well reappear in some other
form.
The EU Code needs international acceptance, which was unobtainable.
To become internationally acceptable, it should be limited to non-military
activities. Both the EU and the United States expressed approval of such a
code. The EU Code now needs different additional sponsorship showing that
such an international code is in the common safety interest of everybody.
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The COPUOS Guidelines for the Long-term Sustainability of Outer
Space Activities209
a. The UN Sustainability Guidelines

The purpose of the UN Sustainability Guidelines is to preserve a
continuing stable, safe, peaceful outer space environment for scientific,
exploration and economic uses of outer space for all countries. In 2010, a
COPUOS working group was established to develop guidelines for long term
sustainability. 210 In 2019, COPUOS approved 21 guidelines for adoption by
the member states. Additional guidelines were discussed but the working
group could not agree on them. 211 The objective of these guidelines is to
supplement the existing treaty framework, particularly the Outer Space Treaty.
COPUOS urges the member states to implement the guidelines for use when
authorizing outer space activities by their non-governmental operators and
when supervising these operators for compliance with the OST. The
guidelines will apply to both governmental and non-governmental operators.
While the guidelines are voluntary and non-binding, states are recommended
to apply them in their national regulation. The guidelines do not constitute
new legal authority but must be implemented consistently with existing legal
obligations under the Outer Space Treaty. The UN Sustainability Guidelines
for outer space are: 212
A1. To adopt and update national legislation and regulation of
outer space activities in accordance with OST Art VI and
consistent with UNGA Resolution 68/74 urging adoption of

209
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national laws and regulations consistent with peaceful
exploration and use of outer space.
A2. To minimize the environmental impact of human activities on
outer space particularly with regard to space debris.
A3. To actively supervise national activities in outer space so as
to promote long term sustainability.
A4. To allocate radiofrequencies and related orbital slots
equitably, rationally and efficiently in accordance with ITU
procedures so as to avoid harmful intereferences with
radiofrequencies.
A5. To promote effective registration of all space objects.
B1. To collect safety information about possible collisions and to
share it widely with other users, perhaps through a safety
information center maintained by COPUOS.
B2. To improve accuracy of safety information and to develop
common international safety standards.
B3. To promote collection and dissemination of information about
space debris.
B4. To perform conjunction assessment during all orbital phases
of controlled flight.
B5. To develop practical approaches to pre-launch assessments.
B6. To monitor and share space weather information.
B7. To develop international standards and practices that will
mitigate adverse space weather effects.
B8. To improve trackability of space objects in particular the
difficult tracking of small satellite effects.
B9. To share information about prospective uncontrolled re-entry
of hazardous space objects, and to assist endangered states.
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B10. To exercise caution in the use of laser beams affecting low
earth orbits and to make prelaunch evaluation thereof.
C1. To promote and facilitate international cooperation in support
of long-term sustainability of outer space activities.
C2. To establish procedures for sharing and exchange of
information about long-term sustainability.
C3. To support and engage in capacity building in developing
countries.
C4. To raise awareness of space activities.
D1. To support scientific research, development and use of outer
space.
D2. To research new ways to manage and reduce space debris.
The UN Sustainability Guidelines must be constantly updated as space
technology develops. COPUOS plans to continue updating the guidelines. In
the larger context, these guidelines are intended to lead to operating rules for
outer space activities. They will become applicable to exploration of outer
space and also for administration of outer space resources by national
governments.
b.

Evaluation

States will tend to follow these guidelines as they adopt domestic
regulation. The appeal of the Sustainability Guidelines is that they represent a
consensus among the states. Within the guidelines the states have managed to
agree on common principles, therefore adoption of these guidelines would
establish international predictability. In the adoption process states would
streamline and facilitate government oversight. If accepted by many states,
they could lead to international procedures which would significantly benefit
all operators, commercial as well as military.
These guidelines are minimalist, they are voluntary, and they apply
broadly rather than specifically. The states may implement the guidelines in
whichever way they choose, if at all. Although they represent a consensus
among states, the states are free to apply them to the extent the guidelines are
within their priorities. Thus, the implementation in the form of national laws
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and regulations, if any, is unlikely to be uniform. Without international
oversight, the guidelines will not develop into international operational
practices and therefore may not add significantly to international operating
rules for space traffic and debris reduction.
4.

Outer Space Guidelines on Space Debris, Space Traffic Management,
and Planetary Defense

The new space age has changed views and attitudes about outer space.
In 1967, at the adoption of the Outer Space Treaty, the environmental
objective was to conduct outer space activities “with due regard” for the
activities of other states and to conduct their activities so as to avoid harmful
contamination as well as adverse changes to the environment of the Earth
resulting from introduction of extraterrestrial contaminatio 213 Extraterrestrial
contamination was the major environmental concern in 1967, whereas today,
Earth’s contamination of space is the main concern; an example is the growing
accumulation of space debris caused by human activities. Space debris alone
promises eventually to foreclose access to outer space according to the Kessler
Syndrome, unless there is drastic restriction of old and new space debris.214
From a space regulatory point of view, it is interesting that the demand for
debris regulation stems from the demonstrated needs of the users. Space
debris guidelines are grounds-up regulation rather than top-down. 215
Another environmental concern is traffic crowding, particularly in the
LEO and GEO orbits. There is more space traffic than originally imagined in
1967, when OST was adopted, and there will be even more. Satellite operators
need a safe predictable environment in which to operate. Satellites are
increasingly exposed to collisions and interferences from other space objects
including space debris and other spacecrafts. Satellite operators, and in turn
their governments, are increasingly insisting on operating rules, such as space
traffic management and space debris mitigating guidelines. The power of
these rules is that they originate with the users and with individual
governments making these guidelines mandatory. However, national STM
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guidelines are not yet the same for all users. 216 The next step is to make the
guidelines into uniform rules for domestic and foreign users.217
a. COPUOS Space Debris Guidelines218
(i) The Guidelines
Voluntary guidelines specifically for limitation of space debris were
adopted by COPUOS and were approved and recommended by the UN
General Assembly Resolution 62/217 in 2008 for adoption by individual
states. 219 These guidelines differ from the UN Sustainability Guidelines in that
the debris guidelines have already been widely adopted by the UN member
states as mandatory domestic regulations. There are no internationally
uniform debris regulations, so the debris regulations adopted by the individual
states may differ from state to state.
States widely support the voluntary guidelines because space debris is
such an urgent problem, both for government operators and for nongovernmental operators. 220 However, implementation of the debris guidelines
varies. For example, in 2019 India, disregarding the COPUOS Space Debris
Guidelines, intentionally used one of its ASATs to destroy one of its orbiting
satellites thus significantly increasing the amount of debris in low Earth
orbit. 221 In accordance with the Kessler Syndrome, 222 debris in space will
fragment into more debris as it collides with other debris. Inevitably the space
debris problem is steadily increasing. 223 Nevertheless, the existing COPUOS
space debris guidelines, with a goal of restraining new debris generation, are
beneficial to whatever extent they slow down further escalation of the
problem.
The 2008 Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines approved by the UNGA
are the following:
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1. To limit the amount of debris released during normal
operations;
2. To minimize the potential for break-ups and to cause
minimum space debris when break-up happens;
3. To limit the probability of accidental break-up in outer space;
4. To avoid intentional destruction of space objects and other
harmful activities;
5. To minimize the potential for post-mission break-up resulting
from stored energy by designing spacecraft so as not to break
up and spread debris including fuel;
6. To limit the long-term presence of space craft and launch
vehicle orbital stages in the LEO region at the end of their
mission;
7. To limit the long-term interference of spacecraft and launch
vehicle in the geosynchronous Earth region at the end of their
mission.
(ii) Evaluation
Stricter debris control is urgently needed. It would benefit all
stakeholders. Space debris affects the safety of them all. The existing
COPUOS space debris guidelines are a step in the right direction. However,
debris accumulation continues to increase. There are now more than one
million debris pieces in orbit. Continuing accumulation of debris may
eventually trigger the Kessler Syndrome precluding access to outer space
from Earth. In addition to rules governing new debris, old debris accumulation
must be reduced.224
The space debris guidelines are actively applied and enforced by major
space-faring states and constitute a beginning environmental order for outer
space. They are accepted by individual states as evidenced by United States
Policy Directive–3 issued on 16 June, 2018. Significantly, the Directive
recognizes the drastic increase in space debris and that space debris requires
regulation. It commits the United States to develop better outer space
224
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standards and best practices. United States regulatory agencies will develop
improved standards and best practices in domestic regulatory frameworks and
use them to help shape international consensus practices and standards.225
Space Traffic Management for Outer Space 226

b.

(i) STM
Traffic in outer space is congested. 227 There are currently only
rudimentary operating traffic rules for outer space:228
1. Spacecraft need interference-free radiofrequencies in order to
navigate in outer space. Governments, through the ITU, are able
to provide interference-free radiofrequencies and related orbits
for individual satellites. Nevertheless, some experimental space
objects may still be launched without prior governmental
coordination;229
2. States and their authorized non-governmental operators are
required by OST Art IX to pay due regard to the space objects of
other nations’ operators;
3. Large objects are currently tracked in outer space by the US Air
Force. 230 While tracking is being improved, the number of
objects tracked is only a very small fraction of the total number
of objects in outer space. Fortunately, the US Air Force is
permitted to share tracking data with civilian operators in the
United States and abroad, but future sharing is subject to possible
restrictions dictated by military secrecy requirements; 231
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4. The possibility of state liability for the activities of nongovernmental operators under the Liability Convention is also a
restraint on governments’ authorization of launches by
irresponsible nongovernmental operators.
There are currently about 4000 satellites in orbit. 232 Commercial
operators such as Space-X, Blue Origin, One Web, and other operators have
obtained permissions to launch thousands of mostly small satellites. This
creates an entirely new traffic situation in outer space. These satellites need to
be safely launched, operated and deorbited without colliding or interfering
with each other. They must avoid collisions with existing uncontrolled debris
in outer space. Small satellites must be deorbited and replaced frequently.
Thus, there will be much launch and deorbit traffic across orbits of existing
satellites.
Compilation and integration of traffic data into a single data system
from the large number of high-speed functional space objects requires very
sophisticated data record systems. It requires that the data are freely available.
The analyzed traffic management data need to be transmitted to the users.
Some traffic is of military nature and may not be disclosed.233 Nevertheless,
an international system, as transparent as possible, must be established so that
space traffic can be safe for all stakeholders.
The United States Space Policy Directive-3 recognizes that the
commercial space industry needs space traffic norms in order to operate safely
and profitably. 234 The Directive commits the United States to:
[d]evelop STM standards and best practices. As the leader in
space, the United States supports the development of operational
standards and best practices to promote safe and responsible
behavior in space. A critical first step in carrying out that goal is
to develop U.S.-led minimum safety standards and best practices
to coordinate space traffic. U.S. regulatory agencies should, as
appropriate, adopt these standards and best practices in domestic
232
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regulatory frameworks and use them to inform and help shape
international consensus practices and standards. 235
Significantly the 2018 United States Policy Directive-3 recognizes that these
national traffic standards and practices will be most effective if they develop
into international regulatory standards and practices.
(ii) Evaluation
Satellites orbit at a much greater speed than airplanes, but a useful
comparison can be made between traffic regulation of the two modes of
traffic. Space traffic, particularly in LEO, 236 can be made safer and more
efficient. Intense space traffic management would permit more space objects
to orbit and the traffic would be safer in all orbits. Areas of particular concern
are: (1) the very busy geostationary orbit of the large communication
satellites; (2) the secretive military orbits; (3) the global navigation satellites
systems in mid-earth orbit; and (4) the thousands of small satellites now being
placed in low earth orbit. 237 Space traffic control needs international standards
and recommended practices like the ICAO flight standards and recommended
practices for aviation. 238 There should be continual day to day STM. As with
radio frequencies regulated by ITU, and in the aviation and maritime realms,
space traffic control should apply to the technical aspects of civilian
activities. 239
Commercial operators and military authorities agree that the huge
increase in the number of new satellites into outer space creates congestion
and that traffic management is required. 240 Collisions and interferences must
be avoided. There are many uncertainties to be resolved. For example,
simultaneous launches of small satellites in a large group often causes the
location of some launched satellites to be unknown for weeks. 241 Individual
235
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countries can direct their own traffic but complete transparency is required to
avoid space traffic conjunctions with other traffic. We need international
traffic standards and recommended practices enforced by all states. Space
traffic will also require more intense tracking and management than is
presently available.242
Planetary Defense Against Near Earth Objects 243

c.

(i) COPUOS Coordination Action Plans
Life on Earth has been close to extinction several times, for example,
when asteroids collided with Earth. One such collision happened 66 million
years ago.244 It is believed that the collision extinguished the dinosaurs as well
as 99.9% of all life on Earth.245 The impact fundamentally changed evolution
on Earth and could be what led to evolution of human beings. 246 The Earth
has been impacted many times since that collision. 247 Several hundred
thousand asteroids orbit in the asteroid belt between the planets Mars and
Saturn.248 Asteroids may collide with each other and divert towards the Earth
becoming classified as Near Earth Objects. 249 It is likely that Earth will be
struck by asteroids again perhaps changing the course of evolution. Humans
may suddenly have to escape from Earth. Astronomers continuously observe
those NEOs that they can identify to warn of impending strikes, with the hope
that we may be able to divert them from striking Earth.250
Planetary protection cannot yet submit to international guidelines, but
the situation is so dangerous that cautionary protocols are being developed.251
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COPUOS is the forum for international coordination of asteroid warning
activities. COPUOS has established the voluntary International Asteroid
Warning Network (“IAWN”) for the purpose of (1) tracking NEOs, (2)
establishing a clearing house for information, (3) using IAWN as a computer
information portal, (4) planning for observation of NEOs, (5) recommending
warning policies, (6) collecting information about possible NEO strike
consequences, (7) analyzing and communicating consequences of NEO
strikes, and (8) advising governments.252
Furthermore, COPUOS established the voluntary Space Mission
Planning Advisory Group (“SMPAG”) to (1) formulate NEO action plans, (2)
identify possible NEO impacts, (3) make plans for possible NEO impacts, (4)
establish communication guidelines, (5) make plans for planetary defense, (6)
establish decision-making timelines, (7) advise how to avoid NEO impact, (8)
target NEOs for deflection, (9) advise on use of nuclear power to deflect
NEOs, and (10) identify action tools.253
The United States adopted the United States National Near-Earth
Object Preparedness Strategy and action in 2018. The United States strategy
includes (1) NEO tracking, (2) forecasting possible strikes, (3) deflection, (4)
international cooperation, and (5) emergency procedures and protocols for
response to NEO strikes. 254 Other states have also developed national
strategies.
(ii) Evaluation of Planetary
A NEO collided with the Earth as recently as 2013.255 The Earth has
records of many previous impacts and future impacts are certain. The
COPUOS planetary defensive action plans are voluntary and tentative.
However, there is no international agreement on joint planetary defense
against NEOs. 256 Planetary protection is unusually well suited for shared
responsibility among the States; however, more preparation in COPUOS is
needed to establish effective international action. In the meantime, some
individual states are adopting national action plans.
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Most of the planetary defense activities are currently at the national
level. NEO strikes are inherently international. They move towards Earth from
non-sovereign outer space. An international action program through
COPUOS should be adopted. Action should not be delayed until an actual
NEO appears about to strike because then there might not be time for
international agreement on action, nor would the necessary tools be available
to meet the crisis.257
5.

Overall Evaluation of International Codes and Guidelines for Outer
Space258

States have different priorities in outer space. However, outer space is
inherently international. The international codes and guidelines described
above depend on adoption and implementation by each individual state.
National implementation too easily results in national differences in what
should be uniform international behavioral standards and operations. The
experience with space debris guidelines indicates that although the states
generally favor international uniformity the individual state regulation will
often reflect its own priorities and peculiarities. Furthermore, states may
suddenly have more important priorities. For example, India disregarded the
accepted space debris guideline when it intentionally destroyed its own
satellite with an ASAT in 2019, which resulted in a new wave of space
debris. 259 Thus, lack of international uniformity is an inherent weakness of the
voluntary international codes and guidelines.
Lack of enforcement is a second weakness of the voluntary codes and
guidelines. States may need international guidelines on debris and space
traffic rules, but they may be slow to adopt them and may lack resources to
enforce the rules. That results in disuniformity in outer space, and ultimately
leads to lack of transparency and unsafe, dangerous outer space traffic, which
is contrary to the purpose of the voluntary codes and guidelines.260
The international guidelines and codes could be easily adopted and
implemented if they were solely meant for non-military outer space activities.
This is proven by ITU’s success in arranging radiofrequencies and related
orbital slots of civilian outer space users. This is also evidenced by the ICAO
257
258
259
260
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traffic standards and recommended practices for aviation and the IMO
standards and practices for maritime activities.261 Like the ITU, aviation and
maritime standards, the outer space debris and traffic rules are inherently
technical and should not be burdened by the military baggage. The civilian
nature of these technical standards and recommended practices will become
more pronounced as the civilian space traffic swells. These are technical
standards and should be treated as such. Military uses have been able to
benefit from the transparency of civilian standards and practices.
In time, the guidelines and codes will need constant updating by a
standing body. COPUOS is badly suited for quick updates of guidelines
because COPUOS only meets once a year. Better would be a standing
committee like the ICAO Navigation Commission,262 which is composed of
experts who can act immediately when the need arises. A good example was
the quick action by the ICAO Navigation Commission to update flight
standards after the disappearance of a Malaysia Airlines plane in the Indian
Ocean.263
A related question is whether COPUOS is the most efficient and
productive forum for negotiation of codes and guidelines. Would decisionmaking in an independent forum for outer space, like ICAO for aviation and
IMO for maritime traffic, be more effective and productive, more technical
and less influenced by politics, in particular by military considerations? 264
V.

CONCLUSION

A.

Complementary and Conflicting Orders in Outer Space

The eight possible legal orders considered in this article overlap to some
extent and conflict with each other. In the examination of each, it is important
to keep in mind that we are now in a new phase of outer space activity. Besides
continuing exploration, we are moving in the direction of normalizing outer
space activities to allow room for and include science experiments,
communication, earth observation, business, military activities,
261
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environmental damage and clean-up, and meteorology. There is active interest
in mining outer space celestial bodies. The sun is considered to be a source of
renewable energy on Earth in place of coal and oil. The sun produces five
times more energy than the total demand for energy on the Earth. Solar energy
could be used to replace oil and coal as energy sources. Inexhaustible Solar
energy could be used to propel satellites in outer space.265 Plans for Living in
outer space are being developed.
B.

Coordination of Present and Future Outer Space Orders

The entire Earth-Space infrastructure needs a coordinated legal order.
Overall order in outer space requires each lower order to fit into the larger
functional order that includes all outer space orders because all the uses of
outer space are part of a whole. Military security is essential for protection of
life, but it should not be allowed to appropriate outer space and exclude other
uses. Likewise, commercial operators must be able to move safely, but
commercial uses and extraction of resources also cannot be permitted to be
exclusive of other uses. There is a need to correct imbalances between the
space powers and the countries that are gradually waking up to the potentials
of outer space. Otherwise, the “haves” will continue to grow and the “havenots” will fall behind. In the long term, we need to prepare for the future uses
of outer space resources in ways reflecting the interests of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic development.
The following steps should immediately be taken to improve order
among the competing interests: (1) international governmental order over
outer space should preferred over national governmental order because
international order can even the playing field upon which developing states
and individual stakeholders compete with economically developed states. (2)
Future access to outer space is threatened by human activities (debris, traffic
congestion, military preemptions) so scientists and astronomers should be
given access to outer space to assure long-term human survival. (3) Safety in
civilian and military outer space activities should be given priority, meaning
national and international governmental should prioritze: (a) reduction of
space debris, which is threatening the existence of all space objects (Kessler
Syndrome); (b) international space traffic management, including
international standards and recommended guidelines; (c) continuous safety
265

See Shannon Stirone, LightSail 2 Unfurls, Next Step Toward Space Travel by Solar Sail, N.Y. TIMES
(July 23, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/23/science/lightsail-solar-sail.html. See generally Paul
B. Larsen, Current Legal Issues Pertaining to Space Solar Power Systems, 16 SPACE POLICY 139, 139–44
(2000).

60

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 29 NO. 1

assessment of space launches and flights of space objects by individual
governments and stakeholders; (d) COPUOS’s focus should be on civilian
technical safety order, and focus of the UN Disarmament Conference should
be on safety and limitation of military activities; (f) ITU should carefully
screen radiofrequency for radio interference that may impede safety of
satellite navigation; and (g) universal space situational awareness must
prevail. (4) COPUOS should develop guidelines on uses of outer space
resources based on the 1994 LOS Protocols to avoid future conflicts. (5) All
stakeholders should be heard. (6) Ultimately, we need to focus on the far
future.
The Milky Way contains more than a billion planets that astronomers
believe are suitable for human habitation. We need to study and ascertain our
possibilities for escaping to those planets because our time on planet Earth is
limited.266 The need to escape our planet may happen sooner than we think,
and we need to find out what escapes are possible. Now is the time to assure
a sustainable future.
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